The Fatuous Uproar About Robinhood and GameStop

The Fatuous Uproar About Robinhood and GameStop 1

Not only is your humble blogger not feeling well and in no mood to write, but due to the uninformed and misguided hyperventilating about Robinhood and the outrage about Reddit touts being deprived of their trading fix and possibly some gains, I feel compelled to weigh in.

I can muster the teeniest bit of sympathy for media frenzy over this story. It’s a happy bit of nostalgia, a reminder of the innocent days of the flash crash, before Trump and Covid. Plus the financial press must be happy to be getting some attention again. First Leon Black, now wild stock gyrations and lots of finger-pointing. They might be on a roll.

But let’s put the atmospherics to the side. This episode, including the grotesquely disproportionate amount of attention it is getting, is an indictment of American capitalism.

First, the idea that the Senate is going to waste its time, in the middle of a pandemic, on some trading junkies maybe having not made as much money as they felt entitled to, is pathetic. It shows how warped the priorities of our putative elites are. This is secondary market trading in one bloody stock. Secondary market trading is societally unproductive (more on that shortly) and should be discouraged by increasing transaction costs (this is one of the big reasons to push for a financial transactions tax, not for revenue purposes, although that’s a nice side bennie, but to shrink the financial casinos).

The company is unimportant. The parties on both sides are competitors in a beauty contest between Cinderalla’s ugly sisters: clueless new gen day traders versus shorts, many of whom look inept at the basic survival requirement of managing trading risk. And as we’ll address in due course, the real bad guy, the SEC for promoting such a socially unproductive market, has yet to receive the criticism it deserves. It’s simply bizarre that cheap market liquidity is being treated as some sort of right.

The focus has been the traders on Robinhood, a free trading platform, although some of the bigger low-cost services also had some trading halts in GameStop. These punters are surprised that a free service might not give them the best, or any execution in a bad market? Did they not work out that they were the product and having their order flow to Citadel might not be a great position to put themselves in?1 Or as Financial Times reader AM put it:

Providing zero commission retail investing is only viable with an inflexible and highly optimised execution model.

It’s no surprise that the execution model fails for small single name stocks when their market goes haywire.

Now in fairness, it appears that not all of the speculators involved in the short squeeze were plucky retail investors up against big bad Wall Street pros; some have suggested that there were hedge funds on both sides of this play. But the press is also running uncritically with the little guys get the better of professional money spin, no matter how well it actually fits what happened.

However, another wee problem with the little good guys versus big bad Wall Street narrative is that the retail traders might be deemed to have engaged in price collusion or market manipulation. Bloomberg’s Matt Levine walked very carefully around the issue and said he couldn’t conclude either way. But his arguments to try to exculpate the Reddit-maybe-colluding longs all hinged on the trades being one big lark. So why should Congresscritters come to their defense if it’s not clear that their activity was legal, and it is clear that they were speculating, not investing? You live by that sword, you can die by it too.

The shorts are depicted as hedgies, when short sellers are arguably the least pernicious financial speculators. They do the unloved and risky work of finding badly managed, overhyped, or even outright fraudulent companies, then betting on their views and trying to educate other investors that they are being had at current price levels.

However, the GameStop shorts look like an awfully inept bunch. Even though at a remove, they appear to be correct about their views of the company’s valuation, if you are a short, you never want to take a position that is so large you can’t get out of it pretty quickly, as in out of proportion to regular trading volumes. This is the same rookie’s mistake that brought down LTCM, which managed to make a outsized bet in the interest rate swaps market. From Ghostrider2014:

Firstly, contrary to what WSBers think, there is no sympathy in any corner (wall street or main street) for the HFs who in their infinite wisdom shorted over 100% of free float – that is just dumb and they deserve to lose in the squeeze.

Secondly, there is no way the long is driven solely by retail demand – there is over $15bn of trading every day for the past 4-5 days and that has to be institutional money. So this is HF vs HF most likely.

Finally, brokerages have no incentive to halt trading unless they have capital/margin requirements from the clearing houses. So this conspiracy theory of wall street banding together doesnt make sense.

Second, the reporting on the Robinhood and other trading halts has been embarrassingly poor. Some of them were circuit-breaker-type interruptions due to the speed of the price moves. But that big uptick in price volatility in turn led the clearinghouses imposing higher margin requirement on brokers trading in GameStop, hitting Robinhood, proportionally most exposed, the hardest. Mind you, I’m not saying that Robinhood handled its customers very well when this happened, but the underlying cause isn’t nefarious. Robinhood is likely to be revealed as incompetent, which is still a very bad look someone handling other people’s money.

See the discussion by the WeBull CEO starting at 1:20 on the big increase of DTCC margin requirements and how that affected brokers:

The simplified version from DSC at the pink paper:

RH has capital requirements for that activity and in extreme vollitality/elephant herd of orders it’s easy to see how that got smashed and how it might have been reasonable for RH to liquidate non margin but RH funded positions


1 Just to be clear, the order flow buying part of Citadel swears up and down it has a firewall between it and the hedge fund part of Citadel, which translates into, “Don’t you accuse us of front-running.”

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